Abstract. We study a multimarginal optimal transportation problem in one dimension. For a symmetric, repulsive cost function, we show that given a minimizing transport plan, its symmetrization is induced by a cyclical map, and that the symmetric optimal plan is unique. The class of costs that we consider includes, in particular, the Coulomb cost, whose optimal transport problem is strictly related to the strong interaction limit of Density Functional Theory. In this last setting, our result justifies some qualitative properties of the potentials observed in numerical experiments.
Introduction
In some recent papers the authors consider a mathematical model for the strong interaction limit of the density functional theory (DFT). In particular, in [3] , Buttazzo, De Pascale and Gori-Giorgi show that the model for the minimal interaction of N electrons can be formulated in terms of a multimarginal Monge transport problem. At the same time, in [6] , Cotar, Friesecke and Klüppelberg show that an analogous optimal transportation problem describes the semiclassical limit of DFT in the case of 2 electrons and provides estimates from below in the general case.
Let c : (R d ρ ∈ P(R d ) be a given probability measure on R d , and T (ρ) be the set of transport maps
where T ♯ ρ represents the pushforward measure of the measure ρ through the Borel map T . We consider the Monge multimarginal problem
c(x, T 2 (x), . . . , T N (x)) dµ(x) : T 2 , . . . , T N ∈ T (ρ)}, (
Following the standard theory of optimal transport, we introduce the set of transport plans Π(ρ) = {γ ∈ P(R dN where, in contrast with (M ), we allow the splitting of mass. To every N −1-uple of transport maps T 2 , . . . , T N ∈ T (ρ) we associate the transport plan γ = (Id, T 2 , . . . , T N ) ♯ ρ ∈ Π(ρ). We remark that the existence of an optimal transport plan, namely a minimizer of (K), follows from the lower semicontinuity of the cost, from the linearity of the cost of a plan γ with respect to γ and from the fact that the admissible plans form a tight subset of the set of measures on (R d ) N . Moreover, since c : (R d ) N → [0, ∞] is continuous, one can deduce from the analogous 2-marginal result obtained by Pratelli [17, Theorem B] that (K) = (M ). Indeed, given an optimal plan γ ∈ Π(ρ) it is enough to apply the 2-marginal result to X = R d and Y = (R d ) N −1 with ρ and (π 2 , ..., π N ) ♯ γ as marginals to obtain the nontrivial inequality (M ) ≤ (K).
Since the cost function is symmetric, namely c(x 1 , . . . , x N ) = c(x σ(1) , . . . , x σ(N ) ), ∀x i ∈ Ω, ∀σ ∈ S N , it is natural to introduce a "symmetric" version (K sym ) of the Kantorovich problem (K) and a "cyclical" version (M cycl ) of the Monge problem (M ). From the physical point of view, this new formulation includes in the model the fact that the N electrons are indistinguishable. To this end, we denote by S N the set of permutations of {1, . . . , N }, we call τ σ (x 1 , . . . , x N ) = (x σ(1) , . . . ,
we introduce the set of symmetric transport plans Π sym (ρ) = {γ ∈ Π(ρ) : (τ σ ) ♯ γ = γ ∀σ ∈ S N } and the problems
c(x 1 , . . . , x N )dγ(x 1 , . . . , x N ) : γ ∈ Π sym (ρ) .
c(x, T (x), . . . , T (N −1) (x)) dµ(x) : T ∈ T (ρ),
where T (i) stands for the i-th composition of T with itself. Thanks to the symmetry of the cost and to the linearity of the cost of transport plans, we have easily that (K) = (K sym ). Indeed, it is enough to associate to every γ ∈ Π(ρ) the symmetric transport plan
which has the same cost as γ. The analogous remark for the Monge problem is not obvious; however, as proved in [5] , in the sharp assumption that ρ is non-atomic we have that (K) = (M cycl ). Summarizing the last observations, if ρ is a non-atomic probability measure we have that
We remark that seeing the nontrivial equality between (M ) and (M cycl ), it is natural to expect as a general principle that an optimal map for (M ) exhibits a cyclical structure, when it exists. We also remark that the class of transport plans Π sym (ρ) is the natural one to hope for uniqueness results, as it is described later. The problem of existence of optimal transport maps and the description of their properties is the main aim of optimal transport theory. As regards existence, in the case of 2 marginals it holds under the so called "twist condition" (see [4, 8, 23] ). In particular for the Coulomb cost (1.1) with N = 2 in any dimension we have existence of optimal maps. In the multimarginal case, existence has been proved under some local assumptions of the cost in [16] , but these assumptions are far from being satisfied by our cost. Indeed we will see that the optimal transport plans are absolutely not unique due to the symmetry of the cost, whereas in [16] uniqueness is a natural consequence of the assumptions on the cost and of the method. In [11] N. Ghoussoub, A. Moameni provide existence of optimal transport maps for some particular costs generated by vector fields (see also [12] ). In this case, optimal maps are not unique and show a cyclical structure as the one presented in (M cycl ). However the structure of the cost function is different from the Coulomb cost and correspondingly the strategy of the proofs is different.
In this paper we show the existence of optimal transport maps in the problem (1.2) in dimension d = 1, providing an explicit construction of the optimal map. The result was conjectured in [19] by M. Seidl from the physical point of view and recalled in [3] . The generalization of this result to higher dimensions is open.
We state our result in the natural class of repulsive cost functions of the form in particular, when f (x) = |x| −1 we obtain the Coulomb cost (1.1). The main result is the following Theorem 1.1. Let f : R → [0, +∞] be a function that satisfies (1.6) and let c be the cost (1.5). Let ρ be a non-atomic probability measure on R such that
Let T : R → R be the unique (up to ρ-null sets) function increasing on each interval
.., N − 1, and such that
Then T is an admissible map for (M cycl ) and
Moreover the only symmetric optimal transport plan is the symmetrization of the plan induced by the map T .
In [3, Section VII C] the particular case when the probability density is uniform on some interval in R is studied. In this case, indeed, an explicit concave potential can be built.
The result is based on a careful analysis of the structure of c-cyclically monotone sets (see Definition 2.1). Indeed, the analytic property of minimizing the Kantorovich problem (K) implies, through standard results in [15, Lemma 2] (based on the two marginal theory in [21] and recalled in Proposition 2.2), that the support of the optimal plan is a c-monotone set. In turn, the c-monotonicity can be read in terms of a geometric property of the support (see Definition 2.3 and Corollary 2.5). It follows from the structure of c-cyclically monotone sets that any optimal symmetric plan induces a splitting of R in
with equal mass; if we look the restriction of the optimal plan to the set {x 1 < x 2 . . . < x n }, the marginals are exactly the restriction of ρ to the segments and the plan here is obtained by mapping each piece in the following one through a monotone map T according to (1.8) .
Remark 1.2. One might wonder if it is possible a detailed description of any optimal plan or any optimal map. Apart from the special case N = 2, we can construct a wild class of optimal cyclical maps. For simplicity, we build our example with N = 3 and for a uniform density ρ in [0, 1] and the Coulomb cost (the construction is similar for a generic N , ρ and a cost of the form (1.5)). Let A 0 be any measurable subset of [0, 1/3) and let B 0 = [0, 1/3) \ A 0 ; then we define A 1 = A 0 + 1/3, A 2 = A 0 + 2/3 and B 1 and B 2 in a similar way. Then we consider the map
It is easy to see that the pushforward of L| A i through T is L A i+1 and the pushforward of L| B i is L| B i−1 for i = 0, 1, 2 (where the subscripts are considered modulo 3). So it is clear that T ♯ ρ = ρ, T 3 = Id, and that the cost associated is the minimum possible, 15/2 (see computations in [3, Section VII C]). In conclusion the best uniqueness result can be obtained in the class of symmetric plans. Theorem 1.1 provides an explanation of the numerical results presented, for example, in [14] fig. 2 or [13] . More precisely the qualitative behavior of the Kantorovich potential (or of the Khon-Sham potential which is, sometimes, very close) numerically observed in the papers above may be explained. These potentials are important elements of the theory. A Kantorovich potential is a maximizer for the dual problem of (1.3) given by
(1.10)
The optimality conditions (complementary slackness) read as follows:
(1.11)
In the following example we consider an atom similar to the Beryllium with one nucleus (located in the origin) and 3 electrons. As electron density we consider
which has the right qualitative behavior. We will show that a Kantorovich potential is concave near the peak of the density (the nucleus) and convex in a region distant from the nucleus. This is apparently the opposite of the numerical results in the papers above but the discrepancy is explained by the fact that in those papers the authors compute
By the structure of T and ρ, we have that
and therefore
Summarizing the inequalities above we obtain from (1.12)
We now prove that u is convex in [b, +∞) and then also in
As before, by the structure of T and ρ we have that
Summarizing the inequalities above we conclude that u ′ (x 1 ) < u ′ (x 2 ), namely the convexity of u in [b, ∞).
A necessary condition for optimality
Let γ ∈ Π(ρ) be a transport plan.
where X(x, y, p), Y (x, y, p) ∈ R N are obtained from x and y by exchanging their coordinates on the complement of p, namely
We say that Γ ⊂ R N is c-monotone if (2.1) holds true for every p ⊆ {1, . . . , N }.
The following Proposition ([15, Lemma 2] based on the two marginal theory in [21] , see also [9] ) contains a necessary condition for optimality.
be a continuous cost and let ρ be a probability measure on R. Let γ ∈ Π(ρ) be an optimal transport plan for problem (1.3) and assume
The idea of the previous proposition is that, if c-monotonicity fails for x and y, it is possible to rearrange the mass of the optimal plan γ close to x and y constructing a new plan with inferior cost.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the study of c-monotone sets, which exhibit a particular geometric structure related to our choice of repulsive costs c. It is expressed in terms of the following definition. Definition 2.3. We say that two points x, y ∈ R N are well ordered if considering the increasing rearrangements x * of x and y * of y,
We remark that, since the cost c is symmetric, we have that c(x) = c(x * ) for every x ∈ R N . The following proposition relates c-monotonicity to the well ordering property of couples of points. 
Moreover if c(x) + c(y) < ∞, x and y are well ordered if and only if
Proposition 2.4 has two interesting consequences. First, putting together Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.4 we obtain a necessary geometric condition on the support of an optimal plan for problem (K). Then, we deduce that the support of an optimal plan is disjoint from the diagonals. We state and prove here these corollaries, postponing the proof of Proposition 2.4 to Section 3.
Corollary 2.5. Let f , c be defined as in Theorem 1.1. Let ρ be a probability measure on R such that (K) < +∞ and let γ be an optimal plan for problem (K) .
Then every x, y ∈ sptγ are well ordered.
Proof. By Proposition 2.2 we have that
By Proposition 2.4 we obtain that x, y are well ordered ∀x, y ∈ sptγ ∩ {c < ∞}.
Now we want to prove the same for every x, y ∈ sptγ. To this end, we remark that the property of being well ordered is a closed condition. Indeed, setting
we have that g is continuous thanks to the fact that (x, y) → (x * , y * ) is continuous and g(x, y) = 0 if and only if x, y are well ordered. By (2.5), every couple of points in the closure of sptγ ∩ {c < ∞} is well ordered, so we are left to prove that the closure of sptγ ∩ {c < ∞} is sptγ. This is in turn true because sptγ is closed and sptγ ∩ {c < ∞} is a concentration set for γ since (K) < +∞ and then γ({c = ∞}) = 0.
Corollary 2.6. Let f , c, and ρ be defined as in Theorem 1.1. Let γ be an optimal transport plan for the problem (K) with (K) < ∞. Then
Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that there exists x ∈ spt(γ) such that x i = x j = t for some i = j; this means that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , N } such that x * k = x * k+1 = t. Now take another point y ∈ spt(γ); by Corollary (2.5) we know that x, y are well ordered, in particular either
. In both cases we have that a coordinate of y is equal to t, so we have that
Since by assumption ρ has no atoms and by the condition on the marginals, we have that γ({x i = t}) = ρ({t}) = 0. Since the support of a probability measure γ cannot be contained in a finite union of γ-null sets, we obtain a contradiction.
A geometric characterization of c-monotonicity
We now focus on the proof of Proposition 2.4, which provides a geometric characterization of c-monotonicity peculiar to the repulsive cost functions. In the following inequalities, the analysis of equality cases will play a crucial role to understand c-monotonicity. We point out that this analysis can be written in a simplified way if one assumes that all the components of x and y in Proposition 2.4 (and in the following lemmas) are different real numbers. In the general case, to fully describe equality cases we need a notion of equality of discrete sets which counts the elements with multiplicity. To this aim, we give the following definition. The next lemma can be read as a description of optimal transport plans between purely atomic measures on R, following the spirit of [2, Proposition 4.5]. Since the assumptions on our function φ are different from the ones in [2] , we prove the lemma for the sake of completeness. Then
Moreover, if the left-hand side in (3.2) is finite, we have equality in (3.2) for some σ ∈ S n if and only if we have the equality of measures
Proof.
Step one. If i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N } are such that
then we have that
Moreover, if both the inequalities in (3.4) are strict and the left-hand side in (3.5) is finite, then also the inequality in (3.5) is strict. In fact we have that x i − y σ(i) ≤ x i − y σ(j) ≤ x j − y σ(j) (with strict inequalities if y σ(i) < y σ(j) and x i < x j ) and so there exists t ∈ [0, 1] (t ∈ (0, 1) if the inequalities are strict) such that
a brief computation shows that
Applying Jensen inequality to these points and summing we get (3.8) (with strict inequalities if t ∈ (0, 1) and the values in the left-hand side are finite, thanks to the strict convexity of φ).
Step two. We prove (3.2) and we characterize the equality cases. We notice that if (3.3) holds true, we have equality in (3.2). Without loss of generality we can assume that the right-hand side in (3.2) is finite. Let us set
. We prove by induction on N that A Id ≤ A σ for every σ ∈ S N with A σ < ∞, where Id is the identical permutation, and that if equality holds in (3.2) then (3.3) holds. For N = 1 there is nothing to prove. Let 1 < N . If σ(1) = 1, we can eliminate the first term in both sides of the inequality and then use the inductive hypothesis, hence
with equality if and only if
Suppose that σ(1) = 1, and consider k such that σ(k) = 1. From Step 1 applied to i = 1 and j = k, noticing that (3.4) is satisfied because x 1 , . . . , x N and y 1 , . . . , y N are ordered, we have that
There is equality in (3.8) if and only if x 1 = x k or y σ(1) = y 1 , or, in other words, if and only if
If we consider τ ∈ S N defined by τ (1) = 1, τ (k) = σ(1), and τ (j) = σ(j) for every j = 1, k then (3.8) yields that A σ ≥ A τ , but since τ (1) = 1 by (3.6) we get that A Id ≤ A σ .
Regards to the equality cases, if equality holds true in (3.2) for some σ ∈ S N we have that both (3.7) and (3.9) hold true, which together prove (3.3).
To prove Proposition (2.4) we rewrite the cost function as a sum on l-neighbors and prove an inequality for fixed l, which is the main core of the proof (Lemma 3.4). In this way, when exchanging the coordinates to obtain a decreasing variation of the cost, one has to track the effect on fewer terms. Before stating the results, we introduce this notation (see Figure 3 for two examples with N = 3). Definition 3.3. Let x ∈ R N and let x * 1 ≤ x * 2 . . . ≤ x * N be the coordinates of x * . We define the N − l-uple V l (x) ∈ (R 2 ) N −l of couples (x * i , x * i+l ) ∈ R 2 with i ∈ {1, . . . , N − l} and we associate to V l (x) the measure Figure 3 .1. The figure shows the coordinates of x, y ∈ R 3 in two different situations; in particular, in the second case the coordinates of x and y are chosen to make x and y well ordered. In both cases, the sets of 1-neighbors V 1 (x) ∪ V 1 (y) and 2-neighbors V 2 (x) ∪ V 2 (y) are represented, drawing a segment between the endpoints of each couple of neighboring coordinates, in red if the couple belongs to x (namely in V 1 (x) or V 2 (x)), in blue if it belongs to y (namely in V 1 (y) or V 2 (y)).
which represents the set of l-neighbors counted with multiplicity. We also define V (x) as the
neighbors as l varies and we associate to V (x) the measure
We remark that, given f satisfying (1.6) and c defined as (1.5) we have that
Given a couple of points (x, y) ∈ R N × R N , let x * 1 ≤ x * 2 . . . ≤ x * N be the coordinates of x * , and y * 1 ≤ y * 2 ≤ . . . ≤ y * N be the coordinates of y * ; we consider the set of l-neighbors of x and of y, namely
In the same way we have that
(3.10)
The following lemma represents our fundamental estimate on l-neighbors for fixed l. 
Moreover if the left-hand side in (3.11) is finite, equality holds in (3.11) for some s if and only if the sets {(z i , z i+M −m )} i∈{1,...,m} and {(z i , z s(i) )} i∈{1,...,m} coincide with multiplicity, namely
Proof. It is clear that (3.12) implies equality in (3.11). We assume in the following that the right-hand side in (3.11) is finite, otherwise there is nothing to prove.
Step one: from s to its monotone rearrangement. Let us call s(I) the image of I through s and let s * : I → s(I) be the strictly monotone function which maps I onto s(I), which exists and is unique thanks to the fact that I and s(I) have the same number of elements. Then we have that
Thanks to Lemma 3.2 applied with N = m, to the ordered m-uples of elements of (z i ) i∈I and (z s * (i) ) i∈I , we obtain 14) where the last equality follows from the assumption i ≤ s(i) for every i ∈ I and the monotonicity of z 1 , . . . , z M . As a consequence, since the right-hand side in (3.14) is finite we obtain also that z i ≤ z s * (i) for every i ∈ I; we can then rewrite (3.14) as (3.13). Moreover, we have equality in (3.14) if and only if
Step two: conclusion. Denote by i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i m the elements of I. Then
Indeed thanks to the fact that i l < i l+1 are positive integers for every l = 1, . . . , m it follows easily by induction that l ≤ i l for every l = 1, . . . , m. In the same way from s * (i l ) < s * (i l+1 ) for every l = 1, . . . , m it follows, by induction, that i l ≤ l + M − m for every l = 1, . . . , m.
From (3.16) and (3.13), since z i ≤ z s * (i) for every i ∈ I and by the monotonicity of f in [0, +∞) it follows that
In particular, since f is strictly decreasing in [0, ∞) because it is strictly convex, if equality holds in (3.17) then we have that z l+M −m = z s * (i l ) and z l = z i l for every l = 1, . . . , m. If equality holds we have that
( 3.18) From (3.15) and (3.18) we obtain that the equality cases in (3.11) are described by (3.12).
In the following lemma we prove that the set of neighbors V (x) ∪ V (y) of some x, y ∈ R N determines uniquely (x, y), in the sense that if the set of neighbors of two couples of points (x, y) and (x ′ , y ′ ) coincide, then the two couples coincide up to the order. Since the statement is of purely combinatorial nature, the reader can skip the proof of the lemma at a first reading.
Lemma 3.5. Let (x, y), (x ′ , y ′ ) ∈ R 2N , whose sets of coordinates counted with multiplicities are equal, i.e.
Let us assume that the set of neighbors (counted with multiplicities) is the same for both the couples, that is
Then we have that {x * , y
Proof. We first observe that the relation µ (x,y) = µ (x ′ ,y ′ ) writes as
and it gives us also that
Writing (3.20) and then exchanging the coordinates of R 2 we obtain also
Now, summing up (3.22), (3.23), and (3.24) we obtain
that can be seen as
where ⊗ represents the tensor product between measures on R. Let φ ∈ C c (R) and let us consider the function f : R 2 → R given by f (x, y) = φ(x)φ(y). We test it with the measure equality (3.26) to infer
From (3.27) and
which in turn follows from (3.19), we obtain with some computations that
As a consequence we get that for every φ ∈ C c (R)
We claim that either the first equality or the second equality in (3.29) is true for every φ ∈ C c (R), which allows us to conclude by duality that either µ x = µ x ′ or µ x = µ y ′ , namely by (3.1) either x * = x ′ * or x * = y ′ * ; thus (3.21) follows thanks to (3.19) . To prove the claim, we notice that if the first equality in (3.29) fails for some φ ∈ C c (R) and the second equality in (3.29) fails for ψ ∈ C c (R), we obtain a contradiction because the function φ + ψ does not satisfy any of the two conditions in (3.29).
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Let x, y be a couple of well ordered points in R N ; we denote with z 1 ≤ z 2 ≤ . . . ≤ z 2N the cumulative coordinates, so that we have either
because they are well ordered. By (3.10), inequality (2.3) is equivalent to
This last inequality is true because we claim that Lemma 3.4 implies that, for every l = 1, ..., N − 1,
and so, adding up over l, we get the conclusion. To prove the claim, we rewrite (3.31) in terms of the z i and we see in fact that the left hand side is simply
while the right hand side can be described as
where I ⊆ {1, . . . , 2N } is a set with 2l elements, s : I → {1, . . . , 2N } is an injective function with s(i) > i (s may not be unique). 
for every l and, summing over l,
Therefore we apply Lemma 3.5 because clearly µ (x,y) = µ (X,Y ) , and we get {x * , y * } = {X * , Y * } in case of equality in (2.3) .
With this we proved the first part, that is if (x, y) are well ordered then c(x) + c(y) is a minimizer among the values of c(X)+c(Y ) varying the partition; however the description of equality cases let us conclude also the second part. Let us take a couple x, y that is a minimizer among all partitions, namely satisfies (2.4); we know that there exists a partition such that X, Y are well ordered, and by the first part, also this couple is a minimizer. In particular we get c(x) + c(y) = c(X) + c(Y ) and, by the characterization of equality cases, we conclude that {x * , y * } = {X * , Y * } and so also x, y are well ordered.
Proof of the main theorem: existence, uniqueness and description
We enter now into the proof of Theorem 1.1; the existence part of the proof holds also under slightly weaker assumptions on f , as stated in the next remark.
1 For example, if X * i = z r(i) and Y * i = z t(i) for some strictly increasing functions r, t : {1, . . . , N } → {1, . . . , 2N } whose ranges are disjoint, we can take I = {r(1), t(1), . . . , r(N − l), t(N − l)} and s : I → {1, . . . , 2N } as follows
Remark 4.1. If we drop the strict convexity assumption on f on [0, ∞), assuming only convexity, we still have that the minimum in (M ) and (K) is realized by the map described in Theorem 1.1, with a completely analogous proof. In this case, however, there is no more uniqueness in the class Π sym (ρ); the lack of uniqueness happens also, for instance, in the classical 2-marginal case.
We recall here a standard result in optimal transport theory, that will be useful in the last part of the proof of the main theorem: Proof of Theorem 1.1. Let us consider an optimal plan γ ∈ Π(ρ); we can assume without loss of generality that γ is symmetric thanks to (1.4). Let O ⊂ R N be the subset of ordered N -uples O = {(x 1 , . . . , x N ) : x 1 < x 2 < . . . < x N }, and let γ * = γ| O . From Corollary 2.6 the optimal plan γ is concentrated outside the union of all diagonals D = ∪ i =j {x i = x j }; since moreover γ is symmetric we obtain that
Let Γ be the support of γ and Γ * = Γ ∩ O, so that Γ * is also the support of γ * . Let us define d
. . , N − 1. We start with assertion (i). Let us fix an index i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}; we know from Corollary 2.5 that every x, x ′ ∈ Γ * are well ordered, but, since they are already ordered we have that either
; in both cases we have that x i ≤ x ′ i+1 . We let x, x ′ vary in Γ * , take the infimum on the right hand side and the supremum on the left hand side and we obtain (i). The assertion (ii) follows directly from the definition of d ± .
To prove (iii) we assume to fix the ideas that i = 1, the general case is completely analogous. First we remark that 1 = γ(R N ) = N !γ * (R N ) and that it follows from (ii) that
Since ρ is non-atomic and (π 1 ) ♯ γ = ρ we have that for every σ ∈ S N (τ σ ) ♯ γ * ({d
Recalling (4.3) we have two cases: if σ(1) = 1 the set (d
In particular we get from (4.4)
which proves (iii).
Since ρ is a non-atomic probability measure, by (i) and (iii) it follows that the sets [d , we obtain exactly that (N − 1)!π i ♯ γ * = ρ i , which proves (iv). We turn now to the proof of (1.9). We introduce the plan associated to T , which is given by γ T = (Id, T, . . . , T (N −1) ) ♯ ρ and we rewrite its cost using that the cost c is symmetric, [T (i−1) ] ♯ ρ 1 = ρ i , and T (N ) = Id: (4.6) sincef (x, y) is a strictly convex function of x − y on its finiteness domain, Lemma 4.2 gives us that for every i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N } there is a unique optimal plan relative to the costf (x, y), given by the unique monotone increasing map that maps ρ i to ρ j . We claim that this monotone map is T (j−i) , with T defined as in (1.8) . In fact T , by definition, is an increasing map restricted to the support of every ρ i and maps ρ i into ρ i+1 cyclically. From this we can deduce that T (j−i) is also monotone restricted to the support of every ρ i and maps ρ i into ρ j . So we get that for every i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N }
Summing up (4.7) for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ N and thanks to (4.5) and (4.6) we obtain 1 N c dγ T = c(x, T (x), T (2) (x), . . . ,
Now, (4.8) shows (1.9); moreover, since γ is optimal, we have equality in (4.7) for every j > 1 and so, thanks to the uniqueness in the classical case, we get that γ 1,j is concentrated on the graph of (Id, T (j−1) ) for every j > 1, namely on {y = T (j−1) (x)}. Hence γ * is concentrated on {x j = T (j−1) (x 1 )} for every j = 2, . . . , N and so it is concentrated on the intersection of these sets, that is the graph of (T, T 2 , . . . , T (N −1) ) over x 1 . Following [1, Proposition 2.1], we get that γ * is determined by T :
(N − 1)!γ * = (Id, T, T 2 , . . . , T (N −1) ) ♯ ρ 1 , and thus also γ is determined (using (4.2)) and it is therefore unique.
